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Mississippi's Prohibition of Alcoholic
Beverage Advertising: A
Constitutional Analysis
By CHARLOTTE K. ITO*
Mississippi prohibits alcoholic beverage' advertising in
newspapers, periodicals or any other printed matter, and on
billboards or signs, whether in "dry" or "wet ' 2 counties, under
the state local option law.' The constitutionality of Missis-
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., University of Colorado, Boulder, 1980.
1. The term "alcoholic beverage" does not include wine or beer containing less
than four percent alcohol by weight. MISS. CODE ANN. § 67-1-5(a) (1972).
2. States which are "dry" prohibit the manufacture, sale or use of intoxicating
liquors except for medicinal purposes. Comment, Pre-empting State Action Taken Pur-
suant to the Twenty-first Amendment, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 590, 601 n.67 (1980) (discusses
whether a state may use its police and taxing powers to prevent out-of-state wholesal-
ers from selling to military instrumentalities). Mississippi's Local Option Alcoholic
Beverage Control Law permits counties to elect whether to remain "dry" or become
"wet." Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 67-1-3, 67-1-U (1972). Approximately half of Mississippi's 82
counties have elected to become "wet." Dunagin v. Oxford, 489 F. Supp. 763, 771 (N.D.
Miss. 1980).
3. MIsS. CODE ANN. § 97-31-1 (1972). Alcoholic beverage advertising is a criminal
violation punishable by a fine, imprisonment or both. It is also considered to be a pub-
lic nuisance which may be enjoined. Id. The alcoholic beverage control (ABC) divi-
sion of the Mississippi tax commission is authorized to promulgate rules prohibiting
advertising of alcoholic beverages in any medium and all retail price advertising ex-
cept on placards or signs inside licensed premises. Id. §§ 67-1-19, 67-1-37(e).
Neither Mississippi's Code nor Federal Communications Commission regulations
prohibit alcoholic beverage advertising by radio or television stations. Broadcasters
had previously complied voluntarily with the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB) Code which declared hard liquor advertisements unacceptable for broadcast-
ing, but the NAB formally dissolved the Radio and Television Codes of Good Practice
on January 20, 1983, as a result of the settlement of the Justice Department's antitrust
suit against the NAB. TV-Radio Group Drops Standards, San Francisco Chron., Jan.
21, 1983, at 25, col. 1. The Codes and their commercial guidelines had been dismantled
under the consent decree terminating the antitrust action. United States v. National
Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C.), 82-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,567, motion
for certification of appeal denied, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,705 (memorandum or-
der), vacated and appeal dismissed as moot per stipulation, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,049, a#7d, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,050 (1982); see also NAB code: R.I.P.,
BROADCASTINNG, Nov. 29, 1982, at 29; Holland, NAB Code Scrapped By Decree, Bal-
BOARD, Dec. 4, 1982, at 15. The Alcohol and Tobacco Division of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), however, closely monitors liquor advertising. 27 U.S.C. § 205(f) (1976).
It imposes a fine if the advertisements are false or misleading or disparage competing
products; after repeated violations, the IRS causes a consent decree to be entered by
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sippi's blanket ban was challenged as a violation of the first
amendment in Dunagin v. Oxford4 (Dunagin) and in Lamar
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n5
(Lamar). The Federal District Court for the Northern District
of Mississippi in Dunagin and the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of Mississippi in Lamar reached oppo-
site conclusions.
In Dunagin, Kathy Dunagin, editor of The Daily Mississip-
pian,' the University of Mississippi student newspaper,
claimed first amendment protection and sought declaratory
and injunctive relief to bar enforcement of the advertising ban
against The Daily Mississippian. The Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi held that the first
amendment did not protect alcoholic beverage advertisements
and that the twenty-first amendment permitted the ban.7
Subsequently, the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi faced the same issue in Lamar, where
fifty-six media plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
Mississippi's advertising ban. The District Court decided that,
notwithstanding the twenty-first amendment's authorization to
the states to control alcoholic beverage traffic, the advertising
ban was an unconstitutional violation of the first amendment.'
This note discusses whether Mississippi's alcoholic beverage
advertising ban is constitutionally permissible under the first
amendment. The note then examines the interplay between
the first and twenty-first amendments.
I
First Amendment Protection of Commercial
Speech
The Dunagin and Lamar district courts differed in their
analyses of the issue whether the first amendment protection
for commercial speech was violated by the alcoholic beverage
any court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations. 27 U.S.C. § 207 (1976);
see NELSON & TEETER, LAw OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS FREEDOM AND CONTROL OF PRINT
AND BROADCAST MEDIA 561-62 (1982).
4. 489 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Miss. 1980), appeal pending, No. 80-3762 (5th Cir. 1981).
5. 539 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Miss. 1982).
6. The Daily Mississippian has a circulation of 10,000. Telephone interview with
Marty Kittrell, Business Manager for The Daily Mississippian (Feb. 11, 1982).
7. Dunagin, 489 F. Supp. at 770, 772-74.
8. Lamar, 539 F. Supp. at 828-29.
[Vol. 5
No. 1] PROHIBITION OF ADVERTISING
advertising ban. The first amendment to the United States
Constitution forbids the abridgment of freedom of speechY
Historically, commercial speech 10 received no first amend-
ment protection." In 1976, however, the United States
Supreme Court extended limited first amendment protection
to commercial speech in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 2 (Virginia Pharmacy).
There, consumers brought suit against the Virginia Board of
Pharmacy for declaring price advertising of prescription drugs
unprofessional conduct and for imposing sanctions on the ad-
vertising pharmacist. The Court decided that the Virginia stat-
ute was unconstitutional so that a purely commercial
communication no longer disqualified the advertiser from first
amendment protection. Nevertheless, the Court still sup-
ported time, place and manner restrictions on commercial
speech if alternative channels for communication remained, or
if the restrictions were necessitated by a significant govern-
ment interest.13 In addition, the first amendment did not pro-
tect false or misleading advertisements and advertisements
9. The first amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. L The Supreme Court ap-
plied the first amendment to the states through the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). See Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1965); J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONsTrrurIONAL LAW 938
(1978) [hereinafter cited as NOwAK].
10. Commercial speech is basically "aimed at improving the speaker's economic
position by private means." Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Com-
mercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429, 430
(1971). Commercial speech usually promotes a product or service for profit or for a
business purpose. NOwAK at 376-78, 411-16, 770-71. A financial motive, however, does
not necessarily make the communication commercial. E.g., New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (an advertisement's political content is protected by the first
amendment regardless of the newspaper's financial motive); Joseph Burstyn v. Wil-
son, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (a motion picture distributor operated for profit, but the
first amendment protected the form of communication).
11. Redish, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. at 431, see L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 652, 655 (1st ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIE].
12. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
13. Id. at 771. Some cases provide examples of such governmental interest: Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (anti-noise ordinances); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972) (maintaining the peace); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (assuring continuing availability of issued selective service certificates). But cf.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (restricting interest groups and other people from
spending on election campaigns not governmental interest); Erznoznik v. City of Jack-
sonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (declaring theaters exhibiting films containing nudity as
public nuisances not governmental interest).
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proposing illegal transactions. 14
Relying on Virginia Pharmacy, the Dunagin district court
held that Mississippi could regulate alcoholic beverage adver-
tising, even to the point of an absolute ban, because the under-
lying transaction of alcoholic beverages was illegal.15  At the
time Dunagin was decided, the elements of the commercial
speech standard had already been established in prior cases. 6
The Supreme Court subsequently summarized the commercial
speech rulings in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Comm'n'7 (Central Hudson). It stated a four-part
test to determine whether the first amendment protected a
commercial communication. The Court continues to apply this
test to commercial speech: 8
1. The expression must not be misleading and must at least
concern lawful activity.
2. The asserted governmental interest must be substantial.
3. The regulation must directly advance the governmental in-
terest asserted.
4. The regulation must not be more extensive than necessary
to serve that interest.19
The Central Hudson four-part test was used by the Lamar
district court in 1982. The court found that alcoholic beverage
advertisements were not unlawful or misleading. Although the
state had a substantial interest in promoting temperance, the
court ruled that the advertising ban did not directly advance
14. 425 U.S. at 771-72.
15. Dunagin, 489 F. Supp. at 772.
16. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-73; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973).
17. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
18. In a more recent case, Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981),
the Supreme Court applied Central Hudson's four-part test. San Diego had prohibited
noncommercial and commercial billboards except for onsite commercial advertising,
such as signs advertising goods or services available on the property where the sign is
located, and for special categories such as bus stop signs, time, weather and news pub-
lic service signs, for sale and for rent signs, and signs for government functions. While
the Court invalidated the general ban on noncommercial advertising, it found that the
regulation of commercial speech met the constitutional requirements of Central Hud-
son. First, commercial advertising in Metromedia did not concern unlawful activity
and was not misleading. Second, traffic safety and appearance of the city were sub-
stantial governmental goals. Third, the Court deferred to legislative judgment that
billboards were traffic hazards and indicated that the regulation directly advanced the
governmental interest. Fourth, the regulation reached no further than necessary; it
was significant that it did not prohibit all billboards but permitted onsite
advertisements.
19. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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that interest and was more extensive than necessary.20 The
Lamar court therefore found the ban to be unconstitutional, a
conclusion contrary to that of the Dunagin court.
II
First Amendment
To determine whether Mississippi's prohibition of alcoholic
beverage advertisements violates the first amendment, the
Central Hudson four-part test is applied.
A. Lawful Activity
The Central Hudson requirement that advertising must re-
late to or at least concern lawful activity to be protected
originated in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations.21 There, the Supreme Court upheld the pro-
hibition of sex-designated help-wanted columns in a newspa-
per because such acts "signalled" that the advertisers were
likely to show an illegal sex preference in hiring decisions. The
Court reasoned that first amendment interests were "alto-
gether absent when the commercial activity is illegal and the
restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on
economic activity" such as proposing a narcotics sale or solicit-
ing prostitutes. 22
The Lamar district court did not directly confront the issue
whether alcoholic beverage advertisements concern lawful ac-
tivity. Rather, the Lamar court merely stated its conclusion
that the advertisements did not concern an illegal activity.23
The court's rationale was that examining the ban on a county-
by-county basis appears unworkable "because of the vast array
of alcohol advertisements received from outside sources in
those counties choosing to remain 'dry'. This Court cannot in-
terpret 'illegal activity' to have one meaning in one county and
another meaning in the county adjacent to it."24
In contrast, this test was the dispositive issue in Dunagin.
The Dunagin district court reasoned that alcoholic beverage
advertisements were illegal because the underlying activity-
20. Lamar, 539 F. Supp. at 828-29.
21. 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (5-4 decision).
22. Id. at 388, 389.
23. Lamar, 539 F. Supp. at 828.
24. Id. at 828-29 n.35.
No. 1]
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the sale, manufacture and distribution of alcoholic beverages-
is illegal in parts of Mississippi.2 5 Even if the advertisements
concerned legal activity in "wet" counties, they concerned ille-
gal activity in "dry" counties. The Dunagin court repeated Vir-
ginia Pharmacy's conclusion that a state may not completely
suppress truthful information about "entirely lawful activity"
and concluded by implication that a state may suppress infor-
mation of illegal activity regardless of its truthfulness. 26 Be-
cause alcoholic beverage advertisements proposed activity
"not entirely lawful in Mississippi," the Dunagin court permit-
ted their suppression.27
The main problem with the Dunagin court's conclusion that
alcoholic beverage advertisements concern unlawful activity is
that the entire state of Mississippi is not "dry." A blanket ban
on advertisements might be permissible if all counties were
"dry." Here, however, alcoholic beverage transactions are legal
in "wet" counties. Citizens of "dry" counties are potential legal
buyers, as they may go to "wet" counties and legally purchase
and consume alcoholic beverages there. Sellers and potential
buyers have an interest in communicating with each other re-
garding the availability of alcoholic beverages in "wet" coun-
ties. "Dry" counties should not have the power to prohibit
alcoholic beverage advertising in "wet" counties simply be-
cause their citizens may be persuaded to travel to "wet" coun-
ties to purchase alcoholic beverages. "Dry" counties should
not be able to prevent dissemination of information concerning
activities legal in "wet" counties through the exercise of their
police power.28 Therefore, the lawful activity requirement of
Central Hudson should not be applied to bar first amendment
interests of sellers and potential buyers; on the contrary, the
first amendment interest should prevail over state interest in
keeping citizens uninformed about transactions related to alco-
holic beverages.
25. Dunagin, 489 F. Supp. at 771-72.
26. Id. at 770, 771-72. The Dunagin court compared the case before it to Mississippi
Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982
(1977), where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a newspaper editor's refusal to
publish an advertisement which tended to promote illegal homosexual activities.
Dunagin, 489 F. Supp. at 770.
27. Dunagin, 489 F. Supp. at 770.
28. Cf. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (Virginia cannot bar a New York
citizen from advertising abortion, an activity legal in New York and illegal in Virginia).
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B. Misleading Expression
Central Hudson followed the definition of "misleading" de-
scribed in Virginia Pharmacy:29 a state may stop untruthful or
deceptive speech in order to ensure that "the stream of com-
mercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely.13 0 The
Dunagin district court did not reach this issue because it dis-
posed of the case with its conclusion that alcoholic beverage
advertising concerned unlawful activity. In Lamar, the district
court stated that no alcoholic beverage advertisements had
been specifically shown to be misleading.3 1
An argument for finding alcoholic beverage advertisements
to be misleading is that the ads mislead the public by portray-
ing alcohol consumption as "appealing, fashionable, and as a
badge of identification with the 'good life.' "32 However, all ad-
vertisers attempt to link their products with the "good life,"
and alcoholic beverage advertisers are no exception. Under
this argument, all advertisements would be misleading. More-
over, there is a possibility that purchase of the product may, in
fact, be fashionable and may lead to "the good life." In that
situation, the advertisements would not be misleading. The ar-
gument, therefore, is not persuasive and shows that the
Supreme Court did not intend the term "misleading" to be in-
terpreted so broadly. An inducement to buy is not necessarily
deceiving.
Rather, the Supreme Court probably intended the term to
apply to deception such as misrepresenting the age of a liquor
or claiming an inaccurate alcoholic content.3 Because each ad
portrays its product differently, each advertisement needs to
be examined in order to determine whether it is factually accu-
rate and not misleading. The Dunagin court should not, there-
fore, have found the entire category of advertisements to be
misleading. The Mississippi Code does not distinguish truthful
from deceptive ads-it bans them all.34 The Lamar court thus
appropriately noted that no advertisement had been shown to
29. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72. See also
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436
U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978).
30. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-2.
31. Lamar, 539 F. Supp. at 828-29.
32. Brief for Appellee-Intervenor State of Mississippi at 29-30, Dunagin v. Oxford,
No. 80-3762 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 1981).
33. NELSON & TEETER, supra note 3, at 561-62.
34. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-31-1 (1972).
No. 11
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mislead the public. In the absence of proof of deception, the
Lamar court seems to have correctly found that alcoholic bev-
erage advertisements were not misleading.
C. Substantial State Interest
In Central Hudson, which involved regulation of advertise-
ments placed in utility company billing announcements, the
Supreme Court recognized New York's substantial interest in
conserving energy and preventing extra costs caused by in-
creases in off-peak consumption.35 Similarly, the Lamar court
concluded that Mississippi had a substantial interest in pro-
moting temperance. 6 In Dunagin, Mississippi's interest was
described as "the duty of safeguarding the health, safety, and
general welfare. 37 The Dunagin court took judicial notice that
alcoholic beverage advertisements promote consumption,
which in turn causes health problems such as alcohol addic-
tion, heart disease, cancer and liver cirrhosis. 8 Thus, Missis-
sippi first protects "dry" counties from alcoholic beverages and
second attempts to discourage alcoholic beverage use in "wet"
counties.
The interests competing with the state's are the first amend-
ment interests of sellers and potential buyers. The Supreme
Court in Virginia Pharmacy affirmed its commitment to pre-
serve a "marketplace of ideas."39 Through advertising, sellers
communicate with potential buyers, and the potential buyers
(the public) learn of brands, prices and other information.
There is strong consumer interest in a free flow of commercial
information in a free enterprise system.' "Advertising, how-
ever tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is none-
theless dissemination of information as to who is producing
35. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568-69.
36. Lamar, 539 F. Supp. at 829.
37. Dunagin, 489 F. Supp. at 771 n.11.
38. Id.
39. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769-71; see also Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772. The "free flow of ideas" approach has re-
sulted in some immediate, tangible benefits. For instance, eyeglass prescription prices
are lower where advertisements are permitted, and there are substantial savings on
drugs when advertising bans are lifted. Pridgen & Preston, Enhancing the Flow of In-
formation in the Marketplace: From Caveat Emptor to Virginia Pharmacy and Beyond
at the Federal Trade Commission, 14 GEO. L. REv. 635, 667 (1980) (marketplace theory
would return consumers to "caveat emptor").
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and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. 41
Mississippi has taken price, brand and other information
away from its citizens, including persons in "wet" counties.
Mississippi's approach in prohibiting alcoholic beverage adver-
tising rests on its citizens being kept in ignorance, a posture
expressly rejected by the Supreme Court.42 The Supreme
Court found commercial information indispensable for the
public interest in making intelligent and well-informed private
economic decisions.4 3
The Supreme Court's decisions indicate that Mississippi's
interest in protecting its citizens by promoting temperance,
though substantial, does not defeat first amendment interests
of sellers and potential buyers. For instance, in Central Hud-
son, the Public Service Commission convinced the Supreme
Court of its legitimate interest in conservation, but other fac-
tors overrode that interest.44 Similarly, the Court in Bigelow v.
Virginia45 struck down a statute prohibiting publication of ad-
vertisements containing abortion information. After balancing
41. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
42. Id. at 769-70.
43. Id. at 765. See also Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582
(D.D.C. 1971), summarily affid sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405
U.S. 1000 (1972). In Capital Broadcasting, Judge Skelly Wright strongly opposed ban-
ning cigarette advertisements from all electronic media:
This is not an ordinary "free speech" case. It involves expression which is
ostensibly apolitical, advocating a particularly noxious habit through a me-
dium the Government has traditionally regulated more extensively than other
modes of communication. But the unconventional aspects of the problem
should not distract us from the basic First Amendment principles involved.
Any statute which suppresses speech over any medium for any purposes be-
gins with a presumption against its validity. If the government is able to come
forward with constitutionally valid reasons why this presumption should be
overcome, then of course the statute will be allowed to stand. But where, as
here, the reasons offered are inconsistent with the purposes of the First
Amendment, it becomes the duty of the courts to invalidate the statute.
Id. at 590 (dissenting). Judge Wright observed that courts give full first amendment
protection in matters concerning public controversy. In so noting, he foreshadowed
the reasoning of Virginia Pharmacy:
At the very core of the First Amendment is the notion that people are capable
of making up their own minds about what is good for them and that they can
think their own thoughts so long as they do not in some manner interfere with
the rights of others. The only interest which might conceivably justify such a
total ban is the state's interest in preventing people from being convinced by
what they hear-the very sort of paternalistic interest which the First Amend-
ment precludes the states from asserting.
Id. at 593, 594.
44. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571-72.
45. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Bigelow, however, may be distinguished because the ad-
COMM/ENT L. J.
the first amendment interest (disseminating abortion informa-
tion) against the public interest (maintaining quality of medi-
cal services), the Court found that the first amendment
interest was greater than any regulatory interests of the state.
The first amendment interests of alcoholic beverage adver-
tisers and potential buyers, therefore, appear to prevail over
Mississippi's interest in promoting temperance. Even if Mis-
sissippi's interest in temperance is more substantial than the
first amendment interests, the advertising ban may still be un-
constitutional because it does not "directly" advance temper-
ance and is more extensive than necessary to serve that state
interest.
D. Direct Advancement
"The restriction must directly advance the state interest in-
volved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government's pur-
pose .... The Court has declined to uphold regulations that
only indirectly advance the state interest involved."' The re-
striction need not be the most direct method to further the in-
terest, but it should not be the least direct method. The degree
of directness required lies somewhere between the two ex-
tremes. The Supreme Court's decisions have not clarified the
parameters of "direct" advancement." "Conditional and re-
mote eventualities" do not justify silencing advertising.' A
"definite" or "immediate"49 connection between advertising
and consumption, however, satisfies the requirement. Thus, in
Virginia Pharmacy and in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,° the
vertisement contained information concerning abortion so it was not entirely
commercial.
46. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
47. See, e.g., id.; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769.
48. Id. at 569.
49. Id.
50. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates extended first amendment protection to lawyer ad-
vertising and confirmed that the only limitations on advertising were restrictions on
false, deceptive or misleading advertisements and advertisements of transactions
which were themselves illegal. Bates suggested that advertisements were not suscep-
tible of being quashed by overbroad regulations just because advertising is indispensa-
ble for profit. Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (a state may forbid in-
person solicitation of clients by lawyers because the state interest in protecting the lay
person from overreaching lawyer solicitation outweighed the first amendment inter-
est). But cf. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1972) (Court reversed a state bar's disciplinary
action against an attorney who offered services to a client). A comparison seems to
indicate that Ohralik should be confined to its facts. Ohralik involved outrageous con-
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Court found that the ban on professional service advertising
did not directly affect professional standards or performance.
"Restraints on advertising. . . are an ineffective way of deter-
ring shoddy work."' On the other hand, in Central Hudson,
the Court saw an "immediate connection" between advertising
and increased demand for electricity. 2
Still, the Court did not define the degree of correlation neces-
sary between advertising and increased product consumption
in order to find a direct advancement of the government inter-
est. One possible interpretation is that the Supreme Court
tends to find that regulations yielding ascertainable results di-
rectly further the government interest. Where results may be
determined empirically, as in Central Hudson's increased elec-
tric use, the Court seems to decide that the advertising restric-
tion directly advances the government interest. Where the
impact of advertising on government interest is more remote,
as in Virginia Pharmacy and Bates, where the link between
advertising *and lower professional standards was uncertain,
the Court seems to conclude that the government interest is
not directly advanced.
When the impact of commercial speech on government inter-
est is "speculative","' the Central Hudson standard (that the
regulation directly advance the government interest) is not
very useful. The limited utility of this standard is exemplified
by its application to Mississippi's advertising ban. Whether
the connection between alcoholic beverage advertising and
consumption is sufficiently immediate or definite so that the
advertising ban directly advances Mississippi's interest in tem-
perance is unclear. The Dunagin court had taken judicial no-
tice of the "fact" that alcohol endangered consumers by
causing health problems.s4 Although the Lamar court did not
disagree with the Dunagin court on the correlation between
advertising and increased alcohol consumption, it could not in
duct by an attorney in soliciting legal services-soliciting accident victims in a hospital
when they were incapable of making a decision. In contrast, Primus did not concern
pressure tactics or a prospective large monetary award. Primus dealt with an attorney
cooperating with the American Civil Liberties Union who offered to represent a wo-
man who had been sterilized as a condition of receiving public medical assistance; the
attorney had also solicited through a letter. Thus, the Court appears to be resolving
these cases on an individual basis. NowAK (Supp. 1979-80) at 154-57.
51. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 378).
52. Id. at 569.
53. Id.
54. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
No. 1]
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"good faith agree wholeheartedly"5 5 with the conclusion
reached in Dunagin on a motion for summary judgment. The
Lamar court heard expert testimony on the correlation and
decided that the ban did not directly advance temperance. 6
One explanation given by the Supreme Court for its conclu-
sion in Central Hudson that advertising had an "immediate
connection" to electricity consumption is that Central Hudson
Corporation would not have contested the advertising ban un-
less it believed that promotion would increase sales. 7 When
applied to alcoholic beverage advertising, the argument is that
the media plaintiffs' suit evidenced their belief that advertise-
ments increase sales. 8 While advertisements may, in fact, in-
crease alcoholic beverage sales, the degree of the connection
between advertising and sales is undefined.
Advertising may have some connection to increased alco-
holic beverage consumption, but it is unclear whether the con-
nection is immediate or definite. The strength of the
connection between alcoholic beverage consumption and ad-
vertising is, at best, difficult to determine. Although increased
wine sales have been attributed to aggressive advertising, 9
many other factors combine with advertising to increase per
capita consumption. These factors include decreasing relative
price of alcohol, growing population, increase in "wet" commu-
nities and lower legal minimum age requirements.6 °
Advertising really mirrors society, rather than shapes society.
Breaking the mirror is not an effective approach to changing
reality. Attacks on advertising fail to recognize that alcohol
abuse was a problem in our society long before advertising be-
gan. There was no advertising during Prohibition. Advertising
does not create values or behavior, and even if it does reinforce
behavior, one would be hard pressed to find more than a few
ads for alcoholic beverages that on closest examination could
be associated in any way with excessive use of the product. 61
55. Lamar, 539 F. Supp. at 823 n.11.
56. Id.
57. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569.
58. Brief for Appellee at 35, supra note 34.
59. Walker, Advertising's Role in Wine Market, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 9, 1982,
at 50, col. 5.
60. National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Alcoho4 Public Educa-
tion, and Mass Media: An Overview, 5 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RESEARCH WORLD 10-11
(1980) [hereinafter cited as NIAAA].
61. Id. at 44 (Sam D. Chilcote, Jr., President of the Distilled Spirits Council of the
United States, Washington, D.C.).
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Instead of trying to increase consumption, alcoholic bever-
age advertisers try to change brand identification.62 Sales in-
crease more by encouraging drinkers to switch brands than by
generating new users. 3 The Brand Rating Index Report de-
fines a heavy alcoholic beverage user as a person who drinks
fifteen or more drinks per week or approximately two drinks
per day. These heavy users are the most important customers
because they constitute a markedly disproportionate share of
product purchasers. Nondrinkers are a more resistant market
so that major outlays are needed to attract them." Advertisers
concentrate their efforts upon heavy drinkers.
Because the link between advertising and alcohol consump-
tion is not definite, the prohibition does not appear to "di-
rectly" advance Mississippi's interest in temperance.
Therefore, the Lamar court's decision that the advertising ban
did not directly advance temperance is not in error.
E. Extensiveness of Regulation
"The state cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to
the asserted state interest ... nor can it completely suppress
information when narrower restrictions on expression would
serve its interest as wen. ' 65 Applying this requirement to the
ban on utility advertising in Central Hudson, the Supreme
Court concluded that New York's suppression extended too far
because it even prevented promoting lower energy consump-
tion. Energy conservation, while important, did not justify
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id. Advertisers attempt to attract three types of purchasers: completely new
buyers, new-to-the-brand buyers and brand-loyal customers. Through product differ-
entiation, entrepreneurs manipulate demand, price and output. Product differentia-
tion distinguishes between "brands," so that the advertiser establishes a preference
for a certain brand. Whether the differentiation is real does not matter; "[tihe only
necessity is for buyers to believe that there is a difference, and to be willing to pay to
satisfy the preference created for the advertised product." This willingness of the
buyer provides entrepreneurs with some control in price policy to maximize profits
and with some immunity from competition. Brown, Advertising and the Public Inter-
est: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALz L.J. 1165, 1170-73 (1948).
64. NIAAA, supra note 57, at 11.
65. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565. See also In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438; First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978); Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Vir-
ginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773; Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S.
695, 701-02 (1977). Carey illustrates a restriction that extended too far. There, the
Supreme Court found that the ban of contraceptive advertisements could not be justi-
fied on the ground that they would legitimize early sexual activity or offend and embar-
rass people.
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suppressing all aspects of utility advertising; other less restric-
tive methods could be developed to promote conservation. Be-
cause the regulation was too extensive, it violated the first
amendment.66
The Lamar court similarly ruled that although Mississippi's
interest in temperance was substantial, the blanket ban on al-
coholic beverage advertising was more extensive than neces-
sary. Inasmuch as alcoholic beverage advertisements
originating outside Mississippi saturate residents, the Lamar
court felt that Mississippi's interest in temperance could be
better served by time, place and manner restrictions on price
information.67
However, a complete suppression is the only feasible
method of curbing alcohol use. "Wet" and "dry" counties are
not arranged into any neat division.68 Alcoholic beverage ad-
vertisements in radio and television broadcasts and in newspa-
pers cannot be limited only to "wet" counties. 69 The blanket
suppression, though extensive, may be the only practical
method of achieving temperance.
Nevertheless, a state may only restrict time, place and man-
ner of speech if the restriction will serve a significant interest
and if alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion remain open.70 Thus, even if complete suppression of alco-
holic beverage advertising is the only feasible method, the
method is not appropriate if it is overly extensive. The adver-
tising ban in Mississippi is not a mere restriction on time, place
and manner-it is a complete prohibition.7 1 No alternative
channels of communication exist. Consequently, Mississippi's
ban of alcoholic beverage advertising seems to extend too far
by suppressing speech based on its content.
F. Summary
The threshold issue-whether alcoholic beverage advertise-
ments concern unlawful activity-is difficult to resolve because
of the "wet"/"dry" dichotomy of counties in Mississippi. Be-
cause the first amendment interests of sellers and potential
66. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-72.
67. Lamar, 539 F. Supp. at 829.
68. Brief for Appellee, at 24-25, supra note 34.
69. Id.
70. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
71. MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-31-1 (1972).
[Vol. 5
PROHIBITION OF ADVERTISING
buyers should prevail over "dry" counties' interest in promot-
ing temperance, alcoholic beverage advertisements do not con-
cern unlawful activity statewide. If the advertisements are
considered to concern unlawful activity, then the case would
not proceed to the remaining parts of the Central Hudson test,
and the advertisements may be prohibited.
Assuming that the inquiry continues, the next question is
whether the advertisements are misleading. The outcome de-
pends on the particular advertisement involved, but unless it is
deceptive, the advertisement is not misleading.
The second part of the Central Hudson test involves balanc-
ing Mississippi's interest in temperance against sellers' and
potential buyers' first amendment interests. In light of the
Supreme Court's decisions favoring first amendment interests,
the interests of the buyers and sellers should prevail.
Finally, because the advertising ban does not directly further
temperance and because it is overly extensive, the ban appears
to be an unconstitutional violation of the first amendment pro-
tection of commercial speech. Nonetheless, the conclusion to
be drawn from the Central Hudson test applied to Mississippi's
advertising ban is not free from uncertainty. Each element
could be resolved in either direction. In any event, the deter-
mination of the ban's constitutionality under the first amend-
ment does not terminate the constitutional inquiry. The next
section discusses the accomodation of the first and twenty-first
amendments.
III
Interplay Between the First and Twenty-First
Amendments
Assuming that Mississippi's suppression of liquor advertise-
ments is viewed as violating first amendment commercial
speech rights, does the twenty-first amendment create an ex-
ception to such first amendment protection? The twenty-first
amendment to the United States Constitution repealed the
eighteenth amendment, the national prohibition of intoxicating
liquors, and expressly recognized state power to control the
transportation, importation and possession of intoxicating
liquors.72
72. The twenty-first amendment provides:
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The Dunagin district court relied on the twenty-first amend-
ment to support Mississippi's power to regulate alcoholic bev-
erages-" It interpreted a United States Supreme Court case,
California v. LaRue74 as recognizing a state's power to "inci-
dentally ban protected speech in conjunction with its efforts to
prohibit nonprotected communications," such as live sexual
entertainment. The Dunagin court decided that LaRue al-
lowed Mississippi to ban alcoholic beverage advertising re-
gardless of first amendment limitations.
The Lamar district court came to the opposite conclusion. It
held that the twenty-first amendment did not authorize a ban
on advertising which was entitled to first amendment
protection.
Although the twenty-first amendment does not supersede
other constitutional provisions, in California v. LaRue,7 5 the
United States Supreme Court used it to bolster California's au-
thority to regulate sexual entertainment in licensed liquor es-
tablishments. California had prohibited sexually explicit live
entertainment or films in licensed bars and nightclubs after
finding that the combination of gross sexual acts and alcoholic
beverage consumption were associated with prostitution, rape,
indecent exposure and assaults. Liquor license holders and
dancers argued that they were exercising their first amend-
ment rights through sexual entertainment. The Supreme
Court decided that although the first amendment may ordina-
rily protect such activity, the twenty-first amendment granted
California the broad authority to control such acts. The Court
stated that California regulations prohibiting lewd entertain-
ment were not irrational and that California's solution was not
unreasonable.76
Similarly, in New York v. Bellanca,7 7 the Supreme Court up-
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or pos-
session of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI.
73. Dunagin, 489 F. Supp. at 772-74.
74. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 118.
77. 452 U.S. 714 (1981); contra on remand Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Au-
thority, 54 N.Y.2d 228 (1981), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2296 (1982).
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held a New York statute prohibiting nude dancing in licensed
liquor establishments.
Whatever artistic or communicative value may attach to top-
less dancing is overcome by the State's exercise of its broad
powers arising under the Twenty-first Amendment. Although
some may quarrel with the wisdom of such legislation and may
consider topless dancing a harmless diversion, the Twenty-first
Amendment makes that a policy judgment for the state legisla-
ture, not the courts.78
The Supreme Court, however, has limited the scope of state
regulations based on the twenty-first amendment. In Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc. ,7 the Court approved a preliminary injunction
to enjoin enforcement of a North Hempstead, New York, ordi-
nance prohibiting topless dancing in "any public place. '80 If
the ordinance had been limited to places dispensing alcoholic
beverages as in LaRue, it would have been upheld under the
twenty-first amendment. The North Hempstead ordinance was
unconstitutionally overbroad because there was no limit to
"any public place."
The Supreme Court limited its LaRue holding in another
case, Craig v. Boren.81 There, an equal protection claim de-
feated Oklahoma's attempt to regulate beer consumption
among males. The Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of 3.2
per cent82 beer to males under age twenty-one and females
under age eighteen. Notwithstanding data relating male alco-
hol consumption with traffic accidents, the Court found that
statistics were insufficient to permit gender-based classifica-
tions.8 3 The Court stated that "[n]either the text nor the his-
tory of the Twenty-first Amendment suggests that it qualifies
individual rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment where the sale or use of liquor is con-
cerned."84 Although the twenty-first amendment strengthened
state authority to regulate live entertainment at liquor estab-
lishments in LaRue, the Court would not extend it to defeat a
claim of invidious discrimination in violation of the equal pro-
78. 442 U.S. at 944-45.
79. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
80. Id. at 933.
81. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
82. A beverage containing not more than three and two-tenths (3.2) per cent of
alcohol measured by weight. Id. at 191 n.1.
83. Id. at 199-200.
84. Id. at 206 (quoting BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING,
CASES AND MATEmiALs 258 (1975)).
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tection clause."5 LaRue thus appears to apply only to its par-
ticular facts-sexual entertainment in bars and nightclubs.
LaRue's sexual entertainment may also be categorized as
symbolic speech-conduct with communication aspects.8 6 The
extent to which conduct is protected by the first amendment
depends on the degree to which a "communicative element" is
present. Although conduct dominated the communication in
LaRue, alcoholic beverage advertisements are considered to
be communication, not conduct. Therefore, LaRue is not en-
tirely relevant to Dunagin and Lamar.
Moreover, the Supreme Court subsequently departed from
the LaRue language suggesting that the twenty-first amend-
ment allows states to regulate speech. In California Retail Li-
quor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,87 (Midcal), the
Court overruled California's use of the twenty-first amendment
to prevent the Sherman Act from applying against a wine pric-
ing system which permitted a wine producer to set wholesale
prices. To assess the extent of state power, the Court focused
on the language of the twenty-first amendment which limited
state authority to the importation and transportation of intoxi-
cating liquors. California's interests in promoting temperance
and orderly market conditions were found less substantial
than the national policy in favor of competition. In resolving a
conflict of state and federal powers, Midcal explains that the
national concern may prevail over state authority granted by
the twenty-first amendment. Similarly, the strong national in-
terest in first amendment free expression must prevail over
state regulation of speech advancing its regulation of liquor.
The cases thus tend to limit the twenty-first amendment to a
literal interpretation, that is, granting states the power to con-
trol liquor traffic only. The twenty-first amendment does not
mention any ability to make inroads into the first amendment.
Craig v. Boren also shows that the twenty-first amendment
cannot defeat the Bill of Rights. This trend suggests that Mis-
sissippi may regulate alcoholic beverages to the extent that it
does not encroach upon first amendment interests.
85. Cf. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964)
(aims of commerce clause could not be defeated by regulations promulgated under the
authority of the twenty-first amendment).
86. See W.B. LOCKHART, Y. KAMisAR & J.H. CHOPER, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAw 1110 (5th
ed. 1980).
87. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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LaRue does not hold that constitutionally protected speech
could be banned where it concerned alcoholic beverages. Cali-
fornia's regulation in LaRue only incidentally banned pro-
tected speech in its efforts to ban nonprotected conduct with
some speech aspects. In contrast, Mississippi's blanket sup-
pression is not merely incidental; it is designed to stifle com-
mercial speech related to alcoholic beverages. Therefore, the
twenty-first amendment does not support Mississippi's blanket
ban of alcoholic beverage advertising.
IV
Conclusion
Even if alcoholic beverage advertising is protected speech
under Central Hudson, further consideration in light of the
twenty-first amendment is necessary. This analysis revealed
that the twenty-first amendment authorizes state regulation of
liquor traffic only. The first and twenty-first amendments seem
to operate with each other so that the twenty-first amendment
does not regulate speech. Therefore, to the extent that Missis-
sippi's advertising ban violates first amendment commercial
speech rights, it is unsupported by the twenty-first
amendment.
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